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This study investigates whether mutual funds that experience redemptions 
preferentially sell their more-liquid stocks.  Investors that remain in such funds may 
inherit portfolios of less-liquid stocks, with an associated transfer of wealth to 
redeemers.  Using 626 mutual fund-periods between 1995 and 1999 we observe that 
funds do indeed have a systematic preference for selling their more-liquid stocks when 
they experience redemptions.  Our findings question the efficacy of a buy-and-hold 
strategy where investors could be disadvantaged by managers preferentially selling 
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Liquid assets can be easily traded without adversely impacting their price.  Open-end 
mutual funds hold stocks that possess varying liquidity, whereas the funds that hold 
these stocks initially provide perfect liquidity to redeeming investors.  This study 
investigates whether investors that remain in a mutual fund that is experiencing 
redemptions inherit a portfolio of less-liquid stocks.  
 
The proposed mechanism is that the fund managers, motivated by a desire to report 
the highest valuation of the fund, (and thus return performance) avoid selling the 
funds’ less-liquid stocks as these would face greater downward price-pressure than the 
ones they do sell, in order to repay the redeeming investors.  Redeeming investors are 
therefore repaid using a valuation of the fund’s asset portfolio that could not be 
sustained in the event that the remaining investors later chose to become redeemers.  
This follows because the valuation of the portfolio is based on the market price of its 
constituent assets, and sustained redemptions would require that eventually even the 
less-liquid stocks must be sold. 
 
Implicitly, the mechanism requires that the (unknown) true value of a redeeming 
fund’s asset portfolio is lower than the value received by redeeming investors for their 
share of the fund’s assets.  Hence, a transfer of wealth from remaining investors to 
redeemers occurs.  
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We assign stocks that are held and traded by each fund to liquidity categories, and 
employ regression analysis and non-parametric tests to investigate whether fund 
managers have a liquidity preference in trading stocks.  We find that when funds 
experience redemptions, they have a systematic preference for selling their more-
liquid stocks.  In contrast, funds do not exhibit a similar liquidity preference when 
they experience inflows. 
 
In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 presents a review of the literature.  The data 
and methodology are discussed in Section 3 while the empirical results are detailed in 
Section 4.  In Section 5 we offer our conclusions. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
According to Fortune (1997), when the stock market experiences a pronounced 
decline, fund managers facing redemptions may preferentially sell their more-liquid 
assets.  During this decline, a transfer of wealth from remaining investors to 
redeeming investors occurs as redeeming investors are paid-out based on (calculated 
net asset) valuations that exceed the (unknown) ‘true value’ of their investment.   
 
A pronounced market decline however is not a necessary condition for the transfer of 
wealth to redeemers, as demonstrated by Chalmers, Edelen and Kadlec. (2000 and 
2001) and Boudoukh, Richardson, Subrahamanyam and Whitelaw (2000).  By using a 
market indicator1 as predictor of the future net asset value (NAV) of a fund’s portfolio 
(since the current NAV is calculated using ‘stale prices’), it is possible to construct a 
                                                 
1 These authors have variously used the S&P500 index, S&P500 index futures, and Wilshire 5000 
index futures as market indicators. 
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trading strategy that will benefit from both market increases and decreases.  Generally, 
this involves buying into mutual funds immediately following a rise in the market 
indicator, and selling funds following a fall.  Greene and Hodges (2001) find that 
traders exploit these opportunities in international funds, and that buy-and-hold 
investors have their return reduced as a consequence.  
 
Price-pressure is where an attempt to buy or sell a quantity of an asset results in a 
change in the asset’s price.  As a consequence of price-pressure effects, the realised 
proceeds from the sale of a portfolio may be lower than its pre-sale total NAV.  If 
price-pressure effects are greater for less-liquid assets, then a fund’s calculated NAV 
will be a function of the liquidity of the assets that are sold. 
 
The impact of price-pressure on the calculated NAV of a portfolio is demonstrated by 
the practice of ‘portfolio pumping’ in which funds preferentially purchase more of the 
small stocks they already own on the final trading day of the year.  Zweig (1997) 
argues that by doing so, they increase their price, the apparent market value of the 
fund’s portfolio, and consequently their reported performance.  This effect is 
confirmed by Carhart, Kaniel, Musto and Reed (2002), and the practice highlighted by 
the censure of ABN Amro and Oechsle International Advisors by the Securities 
Exchange Commission (New York Times, August 11, 2001).  Beckers and Vaughan 
(2001) suggest large traders such as mutual funds can also face detrimental price-
pressure effects when they wish to unwind their positions. 
 
At the individual stock level, evidence of a price-pressure effect comes from 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) who report that where institutions are net 
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buyers of a stock over a period, the price of the stock increases.  Conversely, the price 
decreases for net sell trades, and the impact is greatest on smaller stocks with the 
largest excess of sell trades.  The most direct evidence of price-pressure effects comes 
from the examination of individual trades and trades executed as a package.  Studies 
by Chan and Lakonishok (1993) on individual trades, and Chan and Lakonishok 
(1995) and Keim and Madhavan (1998) on packages of trades, confirm that on 
average buy trades result in an increase in a stock’s price, and sell trades a decrease, 
again with the greatest impact being on small capitalisation stocks. 
 
Investor’s funds flowing into mutual funds following a superior performance, and 
flowing out following an inferior performance,2 demonstrates that investors (rationally 
or otherwise) believe in the persistence of a fund manager’s performance.  Since fund 
managers are commonly compensated for their services according to the total value of 
the assets under their management, their incentive is to increase their apparent 
performance in order to increase fund inflows and curtail fund outflows.  Further, as 
Crossland and Moizer (1995) report, they are concerned by the prospect of their 
services being dispensed with, should their fund’s performance deviate from that of 
the median fund. 
 
Brown and Goetzmann (1997) and Kim, Shukla and Tomas, (2000) find that fund 
managers undertake investment strategies that differ from their stated objective.  Kim, 
Shukla and Tomas suggest that they do this to increase their apparent return 
performance by undertaking a more risky strategy than the one they report and by 
                                                 
2 Studies finding flows follow performance include: Ippolito (1992); Chevalier and Ellison (1995); 
Metrick and Zeckhauser (1996); Gruber (1996); Goetzmann and Peles (1997); Sirri and Tufano (1998); 
and Fant and O’Neal (2000).  Studies finding poor performance precedes demise include: Brown and 
Goetzman (1995); and Blake and Timmermann (1997). 
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which they seek to be judged.  There is also evidence that fund managers ‘window 
dress’ by selling poorly performing stocks and purchasing low-risk or recently 
superior performing securities prior to the year-end disclosure of their portfolios 
(Lakonishok Shleifer, Thaler and Vishny, 1991; Musto, 1997; Sias and Starks, 1997).  
Other strategies that are followed by mutual funds, which impose agency costs on 
investors are the churning of portfolios to reduce the capital gain overhang (Barclay, 
Pearson and Weisbach, 1998) and the incubation of new funds (Malkiel, 1995; Zweig, 
1996; Goetzman and Peles, 1997). 
 
It is evident that some fund managers act in a manner contrary to the best interests of 
investors in the fund.  Since they have the incentive to be able to report the highest 
return performance, it would be surprising if they did not avoid selling stocks that 
would decrease their return performance most.  This would be the stocks that are less 
liquid, and face the greatest downward price-pressure.  Hence, faced with redemptions 




3. Data Description and Methodology 
3.1. Data description 
The database was compiled from data acquired from three major sources.  Details of 
the stock holdings and transactions of all US equity mutual funds that were classified 
as ‘growth’ or ‘aggressive growth’ were purchased from Thomson Financial Services 
Ltd for the period January 1995 – September 1999.  These data were combined with 
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stock turnover data that were acquired from Datastream and supplemented with Equis 
International Inc (MetaStock) data. 
 
The following requirements restricted the size of the sample: 
1. The sum of the value of a fund’s asset holdings at the start of a period was 
within the range of 90% – 110% of the value of their reported assets3. 
2. Stock ‘market capitalisation’ data was available for stocks that represented at 
least 99% of the summed value of a fund’s asset holdings. 
3. Stock ‘market turnover’ data (from Datastream and Equis) was available for 
stocks that represented at least 75% of the summed value of a fund’s asset 
holdings4. 
4. The period between successive reports was not less than 80 days and did not 
exceed 370 days5. 
The above restrictions reduced the sample size from 14,473 to 4,692 fund-periods. 
 
3.2. Method 
Initially we define a liquidity measure, and then identify redeeming or inflow mutual 
funds.  Subsequently we use the liquidity measure to assign stocks that are held and 
traded by each fund, to liquidity categories.  Finally we apply regression analysis and 
non-parametric tests to explore whether fund managers have a liquidity preference in 
trading stocks. 
 
                                                 
3 Funds outside this range were excluded to avoid discrepancy caused by non-synchronous pricing of 
stocks and data omission.  In addition, calculated asset holdings at the end of a period are required to be 
in the range of 75% - 125% of the value of their reported assets. 
4 Missing data were completed using a market capitalisation proxy for turnover. 
5 Funds are required to report holdings semi-annually, however Thomson commonly receives quarterly 
statements. 
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3.2.1 Liquidity Measure 
Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (1998) use logs of ‘price’, ‘monthly 
turnover divided by the number of shares outstanding’ (proportionate turnover), 
‘market value’ and ‘log market value squared’ as independent regression variables to 
proxy for liquidity.  We use ‘stock liquidity’ obtained as a multiplicative combination 
of ‘market value’ and ‘proportionate turnover’ to yield: 
)1()VolumeTurnoverMarketPricelog(LiquidityStock iii ×=  
This measure is also used by Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) as an 
independent variable to proxy liquidity. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 1 presents pair-wise correlation of alternative stock liquid measures.  It is 
evident that log market value, log market value squared and log price are all highly 
correlated and statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  Proportionate turnover has a 
lower, but still significant correlation with these measures.  Stock liquidity, the 
measure used in this study, is correlated with the alternative measures used in previous 
research. 
 
3.2.2. Redeeming and Inflow Fund Classification 
A fund’s transactions during a period are reported by Thomson and we use the start of 
period stock price to define the value of these transactions.  A fund is classed as a 
redeeming fund if the value of its transactions represents an outflow of greater than 
10% of the start of quarter assets where the period is less than 100 days.  If the period 
is between 100 and 190 days, outflows are required to be greater than 15%, and 20% 
if the period is greater than 190 days.  A fund is classed as an inflow fund if the value 
of its transactions during the period represents an inflow that is greater than 10%, 
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15%, and 20% of the start of quarter assets, where the period is less than 100 days, 
between 100 and 190 days, and greater than 190 days respectively.  Funds that 
apparently experience redemptions or inflows of more than 50% in a period are 
eliminated from the dataset as it is considered that the data are most likely in error. 
 
3.2.3. Liquidity category assignment 
The stocks held by a fund at the start of a period are ranked according to their 
liquidity.  It is necessary to assign these stocks to portfolios (liquidity categories) of 
equal market capitalisation to ensure that there is no relation between value and 
liquidity.  If trades are non-preferential with respect to liquidity, then this relation 
should persist.  The stocks held by each fund at the start of a period are assigned to 
one of twenty ‘liquidity categories’, each containing 5% of the fund’s holdings by 
value.  The proportionate value of the stocks in each liquidity category that were 
subsequently traded during the period is determined in order to assess how the 
proportion traded differs from the proportion held. 
 
To allocate stocks to liquidity categories, the stocks held by a fund at the start of the 
period, and those acquired during the period are jointly ranked according to their 
liquidity, from least to most liquid.  The proportionate value of each stock held at the 
start of the period is calculated, and the cumulative proportion of ‘stock held’ 
calculated by summing the proportions with increasing stock liquidity.  Stocks for 
which the cumulative proportion held is less than or equal to 0.05 are assigned to 
liquidity category 1, and those for which the cumulative proportion is between 0.05 
and 0.10 are assigned to category 2, and so on.  Finally, the stocks for which the 
cumulative proportion is greater than 0.95 are assigned to liquidity category 20. 
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Because the stocks held and traded are jointly ranked with respect to liquidity, stocks 
traded during the period can be assigned to a liquidity category using the ‘cut-offs’ 
determined from the proportionate holdings, even if they were not held at the start of 
the period.  With the assignment of a negative value for a sell trade and a positive 
value for a buy trade, the proportionate value of all trades in each liquidity category is 
determined. 
 
Ideally the portfolio would be partitioned to assign exactly 5% of the value to each 
liquidity category.  This rarely occurs because a particular stock holding straddles the 
desired partition.  To address this issue, half the value of the holding and half the 
value of the stock traded are assigned to the liquidity category on either side of the 
partition, and a lower limit of 75 stocks was set for the fund to remain in the sample.  
When it is not possible to assign the stocks to 20 equal value categories (such as when 
a single stock comprised more than 5% of the value of the fund’s asset portfolio), 
stocks are instead assigned to ten equal value liquidity categories. 
 
After eliminating funds with less than 75 stocks in their portfolios, and funds that were 
not classified as redeeming or inflow funds, the sample size was reduce from 4,692 to 
626 fund-periods. 
 [Insert Table 2] 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the 626 fund-periods remaining in the sample 
after applying our screening and selection criteria.  The funds are almost equally 
divided into redeeming and inflow funds both with respect to the number of funds and 
fund-periods which allows for funds to be represented in more than one period.  
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Inspection shows that the two groups exhibit similar characteristics with respect to 
fund market capitalisation, the number of stocks in their portfolios, the magnitude of 
redemptions and time-interval over which they are measured.  The skewness of fund 
market capitalisation and the number of stocks, reflects the presence of a few very 
large funds and a few funds holding large numbers of stocks. 
 
The liquidity of each stock in a fund’s portfolio is measured by the log of ‘market 
capitalisation’ and by the log of ‘market value turnover’.  Accordingly, ‘portfolio 
liquidity’ is derived by weighting these measures by the proportion that each stock 
comprises of the total value of a fund’s portfolio.  It is apparent from Table 2 that the 
redeeming fund and inflow fund groups exhibit similar portfolio liquidity. 
 
3.3. Statistical tests 
The focus of our tests is to determine whether there is a liquidity preference for the 
stocks traded by a fund.  We perform regression analysis and a non-parametric test of 
the association between the proportion traded and liquidity.  For the regression 
analysis, an insignificant coefficient on liquidity indicates that trades are not 
motivated by the liquidity of the stock.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test directly 
compares the proportions traded with expected proportions (which reflect the 
proportions that each liquidity category comprises of a fund’s start of period holding). 
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3.3.1 Regression analysis 
We regress the proportion (by value) of stocks in a liquidity category that are traded 
by a fund during a period, on the liquidity of the category:   
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with )menover voluMarket tur  xPricelog(liquidityStock iii ≡ . 
 
These are performed on 626 fund-periods in which the funds were classified as 
redeemers or inflow funds at some time during the period December 1995 – 
September 1999.  By construction, similar regressions of the proportion (by value) of 
stocks in a liquidity category that were held by a fund at the start of a period, on the 
liquidity of the category would indicate that there is no relation.  Accordingly, for 
each fund, the regression (equation 2) will isolate any liquidity preference in trading 
during a period when the respective betas are significantly negative or positive.  
 
In these regressions, a beta that is significantly different from zero could have 
occurred as a random event.  To determine whether the count of significant betas from 
319 regressions performed for redeeming funds and 307 for inflow funds could have 
occurred by chance, the observed count is compared with critical values obtained from 
the cumulative binomial distribution.6  We use the number of regressions as the 
                                                 
6 The cumulative binomial distribution is the appropriate test because the liquidity betas from the 
regression analyses have a binary outcome (significant or not significant). 
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number of trials, the level of significance at which we find the regression betas to be 
positive or negative as the probability of a success, and generate the critical number of 
successes corresponding to a cumulative binomial probability of 1%. 
 
3.3.2 Non-parametric tests 
Our grouping of stocks into increasing liquidity categories of equal market value 
provides an opportunity to compare the cumulative proportions held at the start of a 
period with the cumulative proportions traded, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) 
test.  By construction, the distribution of proportions of stocks in each liquidity 
category is uniform at the start of a period, and this is used as the ‘expected 
distribution’ where stocks were traded without preference for liquidity.  We compare 
this with the distribution of proportions we observe from the stocks traded during a 
period. 
 
We calculate the number of KS test statistics that exceed critical values corresponding 
to various levels of significance for 20 liquidity categories.  The test statistic (KS) is 
generated from: 
)3(FFmaxKS eo −=  
where Fo = Observed cumulative proportions traded and  
           Fe = Expected cumulative proportions traded. 
These are calculated over all 20 liquidity categories that are arranged in ascending 
order. That is, for each value of k where k=1,2,3,...,20, the observed cumulative 
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and the expected cumulative proportion is -0.05, -0.10, -0.15,...,-1.00 for redeeming 
funds and 0.05, 0.10, 0.15,...,1.00 for inflow funds. 
 
The KS test statistic is arbitrarily defined as negative or positive to be consistent with 
the nomenclature in the linear regression model.  Negative denotes a preference for 
redeeming funds to sell more-liquid stocks and for inflow funds to buy less-liquid 
stocks.  In each case the likelihood of obtaining KS statistics as a random occurrence 
with respect to each level of statistical significance is tested.  We use the number of 
KS tests as the number of trials, the level of significance corresponding to the KS 
critical values at which we find the KS statistic to be positive or negative as the 
probability of a success, and generate the critical number of successes corresponding 




4.1. Regression analyses results 
To determine if there is a relation between the proportion of stocks traded during a 
period and the stock’s liquidity, 626 separate univariate linear regressions are 
performed.  The resulting coefficients are termed ‘liquidity betas’.  Table 3 reports the 
number of liquidity betas generated from these regressions that are significantly 
different from zero, for various levels of significance. A negative beta denotes a 
reduction of the liquidity of a fund’s portfolio.  Redeeming funds with a negative beta 
are preferentially selling their more-liquid stocks, while inflow funds are purchasing 
less-liquid stocks.  The binomial distribution was used to confirm that the counts of 
the liquidity betas exceed that expected by a random occurrence. 
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[Insert Table 3] 
Panel A shows the count of liquidity betas for 319 redeeming fund-periods, which 
increases as the level of statistical significance is relaxed.  Fund-periods with a 
negative liquidity beta are approximately three times more prevalent than fund-periods 
with a positive liquidity beta.  This is consistent with the interpretation that there is a 
systematic tendency for redeeming funds to preferentially sell their more-liquid 
stocks.  
 
Panel B considers 307 inflow fund-periods.  It is apparent that negative and positive 
liquidity betas are approximately in balance for each significance level.  This is 
consistent with the interpretation that while individual funds may exhibit a preference 
for buying either more or less-liquid stocks, there is no systematic tendency across 
inflow funds for them to do so.  The count of liquidity betas in Panel B is similar to 
that of the positive liquidity betas reported in Panel A.  This adds to the interpretation 
by suggesting that while individual funds may be cognisant of the liquidity of the 
stocks they trade; these funds represent no more than a base-level proportion. 
 
There are strong non-systematic influences on a fund’s choice of which stocks to trade 
which may show as a preference for liquidity and account for the base-level 
proportion.  Table 3 however, highlights a systematic preference for funds facing 
redemptions to preferentially sell their more-liquid stocks in order to meet these 
redemptions. 
 
Table 4 presents a time-series analysis of the liquidity betas previously pooled and 
reported in Table 3.  For each quarter, the number of funds is reported along with the 
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percentage of associated liquidity betas that are significantly negative or positive at 
the various levels.  It is evident that the number of funds increases over time 
irrespective of whether it is a redeeming or inflow fund, reflecting both an increase in 
the number of funds and an improvement in the quality of the data. 
[Insert Table 4] 
Panel A demonstrates that for redeeming funds, there is variability in the count of 
liquidity betas over time. In the period June-December 1998 the proportion of 
significantly negative liquidity betas is below the pooled count of liquidity betas for 
the sample period.  However, a supplementary investigation shows that market 
conditions during this period may have resulted in funds selling low capitalisation 
stocks irrespective of any concern for liquidity.  Conversely, eliminating this period 
from the pooled count would have strengthened the result of Table three. 
 
The period June-December 1998 coincides with a major correction in small 
capitalisation stock prices.  This may be confirmed by perusal of Figure 1, which 
illustrates the Wilshire Small Cap price index (less-liquid stocks) and the S&P500 
price index (more-liquid stocks) after re-basing them to 100 on January 1st, 1995.  
Also shown to assist comparison, is the difference between these re-based series.  
 [Insert Figure 1] 
The Wilshire Small Cap price index declined by 41% between April and October 
19987, while the S&P 500 price index exhibited a much smaller (19%)8 and lagged 
decline around the same period.  
 
                                                 
7 The Wilshire Small Cap price index stood at 701.90 on April 22nd, 1998 and fell to 417.23 on October 
8th, 1998. 
8 The S&P500 price index stood at 1186.75 on July 17th, 1998 and fell to 957.28 on August 31st, 1998. 
 18 
A possible explanation may be that funds experiencing redemptions sought to re-
position their portfolios away from small stocks in which sentiment had become 
bearish to make themselves more attractive to investors (consistent with window-
dressing). 
 
Panel B demonstrates that for inflow funds, the count of negative and positive betas is 
essentially time invariant in a statistical sense.  However, when a slightly lower 
criterion for statistical significance is used, these funds exhibit a stronger than average 
preference for purchasing less-liquid stocks during the June-December 1998 period.  
In view of Figure 1, it is possible that they may have availed themselves of the 
opportunity to bargain-hunt in the (less-liquid) small capitalisation stocks. 
 
4.2. Non-parametric test results 
To determine if there is a relation between the proportion of stocks traded during a 
period and the stock’s liquidity, 626 separate non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
tests are performed.  For each fund-period, we report in Table 5 the number of KS test 
statistics that exceed critical values corresponding to the levels of statistical 
significance.  We define a KS test statistic to be ‘negative’ when the cumulative 
proportion of stocks (ranked by ascending liquidity) that are traded, exceed the 
expected cumulative proportions.  Hence, a negative KS test statistic indicates a 
preference for redeeming funds to preferentially sell more-liquid stocks and for inflow 
funds a preference to buy less-liquid stocks.  The binomial distribution was used to 
confirm that the counts of funds satisfying the KS test exceed those expected by a 
random occurrence. 
[Insert Table 5] 
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Panel A indicates that for redeeming funds there are approximately 2.5 times more 
fund-periods in which funds exhibit a preference for selling more-liquid stocks.  This 
supports the earlier finding of the regression analysis that there is a systematic 
preference for funds facing redemptions to sell their more-liquid stocks, but without 
the requirement that the relation be linear.  In Panel B it is apparent that the KS 
statistics indicating a preference for funds to buy less-liquid stocks is only marginally 
higher than the preference to buy more-liquid stocks.  Comparison of funds with a 
positive KS test statistic between Panel A and Panel B shows funds have a similar 




Open-end mutual funds hold stocks with varying liquidity.  However, redeeming 
investors are provided with perfect liquidity.  Redeemers also benefit if incorrect net 
asset valuations reflecting stale prices cause a transfer of wealth to redeemers, a 
problem that is further exacerbated if managers defer price-pressure effects on the 
valuation of the portfolio by preferentially selling more-liquid stocks. 
 
By assembling portfolios of varying liquidity, we are able to observe whether trades 
by a fund show a preference for liquidity.  We find that funds have a systematic 
preference for selling their more-liquid stocks when they experience redemptions.  In 
contrast, funds experiencing inflows do not exhibit a similar liquidity preference.  
These results are apparent from regression analyses and confirmed by non-parametric 
tests.  Supplementary empirical tests show these results to be robust over time. 
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Our findings question the efficacy of a buy-and-hold strategy where fund investors 
could be disadvantaged by managers preferentially selling their more-liquid assets.  
By preferentially selling the more-liquid stock in redeeming funds, managers 
artificially support the fund’s NAV and their own apparent performance.  This is 
consistent with evidence of opportunistic behaviour by managers identified in other 
studies, which impose costs on fund investors. 
 
When investors buy the shares of an open-ended fund, they purchase a portfolio of 
stocks with inherent return and liquidity characteristics.  Traditionally, when assessing 
a fund’s performance the focus has only been on the collective returns of the stocks.  
However, this ignores consideration of the liquidity of the stocks in a fund’s portfolio, 
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Stock liquidity measures correlation matrix 
 
The matrix is based on 5,385 stocks held in June 1999 by mutual funds used in this study. 
We define stock liquidity as:   Stock Liquidityi = log(Pricei x Market Turnover Volumei). 
Liquidity measures Ln MV LnMVSq PropTO LnPrice 
Stock 
Liquidity 
Log (market value)  [LnMV] 1.00      
[Log (market value)]2  [LnMVSq] 0.91 1.00     
Proportionate turnover  [PropTO] 0.06 0.05 1.00    
Log price  [LnPrice] 0.73 0.70 0.09 1.00   
Stock liquidity 0.60 0.53 0.40 0.74 1.00 





Descriptive statistics  
 
Descriptive statistics for 626 fund-periods in which the funds were classified as redeemers 
or inflow funds at some time during the period December 1995 – September 1999.  The 
Number of fund-periods includes funds that were redeemer or inflow funds for more than 
one period between December 1995 and September 1999; Redemptions, the percentage of 
fund assets redeemed during the period where a negative value represents an inflow fund; 
Portfolio liquidity, the proportionate holding (by value) of each stock held in a fund’s 
portfolio weighted by the corresponding stock liquidity. 
 Redeeming fund-periods Inflow fund-periods 
Number of fund-periods 





 Mean Median Std 
Dev 
Mean Median Std 
Dev 
Market capitalisation ($ million) 
Number of stocks in portfolio 
Redemptions (%) 
Interval (days) 
Portfolio liquidity  
- Log market capitalisation 















































Significant liquidity betas across redeeming and inflow funds 
 
The table reports the number of statistically significant liquidity betas generated 
from linear regressions of:   jjj LiquidityTradeProp εβα ++=  
where  




 tradedcategorystock  of Value























These were performed on 626 fund-periods in which the funds were classified 
as either redeeming or inflow funds at some time during the period December 
1995 – September 1999.   
Panel A:  Redeeming funds – 319 fund-periods 
 Liquidity beta 
Negative Positive Significance 

















Panel B:  Inflow funds – 307 fund-periods 
 Liquidity beta 
Negative Positive Significance 
















All values are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.   
 
In each case the likelihood of obtaining liquidity betas as a random occurrence 
with respect to each level of statistical significance was tested.  The cumulative 





Time-series of significant liquidity betas across redeeming and inflow funds. 
 
Panel A: Redeeming funds 
  Negative liquidity beta Positive liquidity beta 
Significance Significance Period Number of 
funds in 
period 
0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 
Mar-95 2 *100% *100% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
Jun-95 6 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Sep-95 8 25% 25% 13% 0% 0% 0% 
Dec-95 8 *63% *50% 13% 13% 13% 0% 
Mar-96 6 17% 17% 0% 33% *33% 0% 
Jun-96 4 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Sep-96 4 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 
Dec-96 9 11% 11% 11% 11% 0% 0% 
Mar-97 12 *58% *50% 17% 0% 0% 0% 
Jun-97 16 25% 19% 13% 6% 6% 0% 
Sep-97 10 30% 20% 20% 0% 0% 0% 
Dec-97 26 *65% *46% *23% *0% 0% 0% 
Mar-98 17 35% 35% 24% 12% 12% 6% 
Jun-98 16 31% 25% 19% 19% 13% 6% 
Sep-98 47 *13% *6% *2% *19% *15% 6% 
Dec-98 31 *16% *3% *3% *23% 13% *10% 
Mar-99 45 33% 22% *4% 11% 9% 4% 
Jun-99 32 *47% *38% *28% 3% *0% 0% 
Sep-99 20 *10% 10% 10% 10% 5% 0% 




Table 4 (continued) 
Panel B: Inflow funds 
  Negative liquidity beta Positive liquidity beta 
Significance Significance Period Number of 
funds in 
period 
0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 
Mar-95 3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Jun-95 5 20% 20% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Sep-95 6 0% 0% 0% 33% 33% 17% 
Dec-95 8 0% 0% 0% *38% 25% 0% 
Mar-96 5 0% 0% 0% 20% 20% 20% 
Jun-96 5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Sep-96 8 0% 0% 0% 13% 13% 0% 
Dec-96 22 9% 9% 5% 23% 18% 5% 
Mar-97 11 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 0% 
Jun-97 11 27% 18% 9% 9% 0% 0% 
Sep-97 21 19% 14% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Dec-97 22 *32% 23% 9% 5% 0% 0% 
Mar-98 28 *29% 14% 7% 11% 4% 4% 
Jun-98 27 11% 7% 4% 7% 7% 0% 
Sep-98 21 19% 19% 10% 14% 10% 5% 
Dec-98 37 24% 19% 5% 11% 11% 8% 
Mar-99 24 21% 13% 0% 8% 8% 4% 
Jun-99 23 13% 13% 4% 17% 17% 0% 
Sep-99 20 10% 5% 0% 10% 10% 10% 
Total 307 17% 12% 5% 12% 9% 4% 





Significant Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test statistics across redeeming and 
inflow funds 
 
The table reports the number of KS test statistics that exceed critical values 
corresponding to the levels of significance in the left-hand column for 20 
liquidity categories.  The test statistic (KS) is generated from eo FFmaxKS −=  
where Fo is the observed cumulative proportion and Fe is the expected 
cumulative proportion.  The cumulative proportions are calculated over all 20 
liquidity categories which are arranged in ascending order. That is, for each 
value of k where k=1,2,3,...,20.  The observed cumulative proportion from 







 tradedcategorystock  of Value
 tradedcategorystock  Value
 
and the expected cumulative proportion is -0.05, -0.10, -0.15,...,-1.00 for 
redeeming funds and 0.05, 0.10, 0.15,...,0.10 for inflow funds. The KS test 
statistic was arbitrarily defined as negative or positive to be consistent with the 
nomenclature in Table 3 for the linear regression.  Negative denotes a 
preference for redeeming funds to sell more-liquid stocks and for inflow funds 
to buy less-liquid stocks.  The KS test was performed on 626 fund-periods in 
which the funds were classified as redeemers or inflow funds at some time 
during the period December 1995 – September 1999.   
Panel A:  Redeeming funds – 319 fund-periods 
 KS test statistic 
Negative Positive Significance 

















Panel B:  Inflow funds – 307 fund-periods 
 KS test statistic 
Negative Positive Significance 
















All values are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.   
 
In each case the likelihood of obtaining KS statistics as a random occurrence 
with respect to each level of statistical significance was tested.  The 
cumulative binomial critical values at 1% are 5, 15 and 26 (2-tailed). 
 
 29 


















Source:  Datastream 
Figure 1   
Small and large capitalisation stock price indices 
 
